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Abstract 
A large empirical literature analyzes determinants of the make-or-buy decision. 
Transaction cost economics highlights the role of asset specificity, the property 
rights theory focuses on the relative marginal contributions to joint surplus 
creation, and some evidence suggests that making transactions more contractible 
facilitates outsourcing. We use a unique transaction-level dataset of outsourced 
automotive components to predict carmakers’ choices between four distinct ways 
of organizing sourcing relationships. We derive conditional predictions for three 
characteristics: (i) the complexity or contractibility of a transaction, (ii) how 
objectively codifiable performance is, and (iii) the supplier’s capabilities. For 
example, while dominant buyer investments might predict vertical integration, as 
in the property rights theory, other characteristics might convince a buyer to 
simply re-organize the collaboration with the supplier in a more suitable way. 
Our results suggest that “buy” relationships differ systematically and that the 
predictive power of our variables extend from the make-or-buy decision to how-
to-buy. 
  
                                                 
1 We would like to thank participants in seminars at Bielefeld, KU Leuven, LSE, the NBER, and Utrecht, 
in particular Tim Sturgeon, Steve Tadelis and Frank Verboven, for their comments. Financial support from 
FWO and KU Leuven Program Financing “Governments and Markets” is gratefully acknowledged. Contact 
information: Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Department of Economics, KU Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 
Leuven, Belgium. Email: Jo.VanBiesebroeck@kuleuven.be.  
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1. Introduction 
Most studies of the make-or-buy decision motivate their estimating equation by appealing 
to a specific theory that predicts a positive or negative effect of a key explanatory factor on 
the probability of outsourcing. One of the best known examples is Monteverde and Teece 
(1982), who find that car manufacturers are more likely to produce components in-house, 
rather than buy externally, if their design requires more engineering effort. This approach has 
two related problems. First, alternative theories that highlight different explanatory factors 
can provide contradictory predictions. Second, lumping all forms of outsourcing into a single 
“buy” category ignores a lot of interesting variation in the collaboration between buyers and 
suppliers, which can differ by contract or organizational design. 
 Monteverde and Teece (1982) work in the transaction cost economics (TCE) framework 
and emphasize that high engineering effort will involve transaction-specific assets and bring 
uncertainty. It thus increases the chance of holdup as the carmaker and supplier, bound 
together by their assets, risk arguing over the division of unforeseen costs when a design 
needs to be adjusted. However, other theories highlight other dimensions of a transaction that 
might dominate decision making. For example, the property rights theory (PRT) of Grossman 
and Hart (1986) argues that outsourcing, i.e. letting an external supplier rather than an in-
house division produce the component, moves control over sunk investments from the buyer 
to the supplier. The decision to “buy” a component strengthens the bargaining power, and 
thus the investment incentives, of the entity producing the input. Depending on the relative 
importance of this investment, it can sway the make-or-buy decision one way or the other. 
But what should a firm do if engineering effort is high, but has to be provided by the supplier 
(or internal sub-division)? What if predictions of the two theories conflict? 
One way to make progress is to take a closer look at the different ways buyers and 
suppliers organize their relationships and distinguish between various types of outsourcing. 
In our empirical analysis we work with a dataset that contains approximately 55,000 sourcing 
transactions in the automotive industry, information that is usually confidential and rarely 
observed. Each transaction is identified by the following triplet: (i) a car model (buyer), (ii) 
a supplying firm, and (iii) an automotive component. Cars are very complex products 
consisting of a bewildering number of components which makes the automotive industry one 
of the most downstream manufacturing industries (Antràs, Chor, Fally and Hillberry, 2012). 
Carmakers need to interact with virtually all other manufacturing industries, sourcing 
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different types of components in a wide range of circumstances. We investigate whether 
firms tailor their supplier governance, i.e. the way they collaborate with suppliers, to the 
situation. 
 Table 1 lists a few patterns for three of the suppliers in our dataset: the average fraction 
of sales going to each supplier’s most important buyer, the supplier’s (global) market share 
in its principal product, and the share of a product’s (global) market share accounted for by 
an average client.2 The large differences between suppliers suggest that it is unlikely to be a 
good idea to lump all types of outsourcing together, as is done in the make-or-buy literature. 
Some studies have explicitly considered more complex forms of firm-to-firm relationships, 
called networks of suppliers by Powell (1990) or hybrid modes of organization by Ménard 
(2013).  
Table 1:  Examples of buyer-supplier interactions 
Supplier name Most important 
component 
% of sales 
going to most 
important 
buyer 
% of product’s 
global market 
share by this 
supplier 
% of product’s 
global market 
share by average 
client 
Smarteq infotainment 97% 1% 19% 
Gallino Plasturgia bumper 15% 1% 3% 
Wescast exhaust manifolds 34% 39% 8% 
Note: Own calculations based on full dataset. 
To go beyond the make-or-buy dichotomy and investigate firms’ choices between several 
organizational forms, we face two challenges. First, we need to define and identify a discrete 
set of supplier governance types. The legal definition of firm ownership directly distinguishes 
in-house production from arm’s length outsourcing. To distinguish objectively between 
forms of governance one needs a mapping from the observable features of buyer-supplier 
interactions to a set of governance types. Such a mapping should be applicable in a variety 
of economic settings. Second, to be useful in empirical work, we need to predict firms’ 
choices between governance types using observed characteristics of the transactions, or of 
the buyers and suppliers. 
                                                 
2 All market shares are calculated over the transactions we observe; in the Data section below we discuss 
the sample and variable construction in detail.  
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Rather than exhaustively partitioning all observed relationships into a few types, we 
associate each governance type that we consider with a continuous proxy variable. For 
example, in a so-called captive relationship the buyer provides the supplier with 
technological support and guarantees it a stream of sales, but demands exclusivity in return.3 
The number of clients a supplier works for will vary inversely with the probability that the 
relationship is of a captive type. These proxy variables are the dependent variables of our 
regressions and replace the vertical integration dummy in the make-or-buy literature.4 For 
each of the four governance types that we consider, we estimate a separate equation. Case 
studies of different industries played an important role in identifying the possible forms of 
buyer-supplier collaboration and the associated proxy variables. Additional governance types 
can be added if one is able to propose a defining feature that sets such relationships apart 
from other forms.  
We further argue that the same explanatory variables that are able to predict make-or-buy 
decisions, and have been studied previously, also influence firms’ choices between these 
supplier governance types. We consider three  characteristics of component or firms, each 
motivated by a distinct (economic) theory of the firm: ability to write complete contracts, 
degree of asset specificity, and the relative importance of marginal investments (of suppliers).  
We will illustrate that these characteristics are closely related to the three determinants of 
governance used in the widely cited study of Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2008) in the 
literature on global value chains: complexity, codifiability, and supplier capabilities.  
Our contribution then is twofold. First, without developing an original theory for each 
trade-off between two governance types, as in Bajari and Tadelis (2001) for two types of 
contracting, nor micro-founding a unifying theory that explicitly nests several explanations, 
as in Gibbons (2005), we propose a unified framework and focus on conditional predictions 
of the impact of each characteristic on the type of governance, holding other characteristics 
constant. Other studies are often able to focus on the effect of one particular explanatory 
factor because their sample comes from a setting that implicitly holds many other factors 
                                                 
3 Captive supply relationships have a long history in the automotive industry. Klein (2007) investigates the 
failed attempt of General Motors to hold Fisher Body a captive supplier. 
4 If our sample also included buyer-component pairs that are sourced in-house, we could add the integration 
dummy as a fifth proxy variable and add in-house production as an addition governance type in the analysis. 
Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2017) propose a way to expand the sample and study the make-or-buy decision 
with the same dataset.   
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constant. For example, in the context of the make-or-buy decision, a high relative importance 
of supplier investments only predicts outsourcing if contracts are incomplete. Otherwise, a 
buyer could contractually specify performance requirements, irrespective of the 
organizational form. Similarly, specific investments only predict integration if a buyer cannot 
contractually specify a supplier’s compensation for future adjustments and if the supplier’s 
investment is not so dominant to make in-house production entirely inefficient. Because the 
carmakers in our sample source components from a wide range of industries and 
circumstances, we need to explicitly control for explanatory factors linked to different 
theories. The marginal impact of each characteristic is only unambiguous if other 
characteristics are held constant. 
Second, we estimate the impact of the proposed variables on the choice of governance 
using a unique transaction-level dataset of sourcing relationships in the automotive industry. 
In contrast with the existing literature which predicts which activities should be organized 
in-house or outsourced, we predict what type of supply relationship a buyer should establish, 
i.e. we estimate the how-to-buy choice rather than the make-or-buy choice. Using the patterns 
in the supply relationships that we observe in the overall dataset, we distinguish between four 
forms of supplier governance (the dependent variables) and we relate them to three 
explanatory variables that are motivated by established theories of the firm: complexity or 
contractibility (contract theory), codifiability or asset-specificity (TCE), and supplier 
capabilities or relative importance of marginal investments (PRT). 
The estimation results support the theoretical predictions. Less complex components are 
more likely to be sourced through arm’s length market type of governance. Components for 
which it is difficult to objectively codify performance requirements are more likely to be 
sourced through a relational type of governance where suppliers produce only a few 
components, but collaborate closely with a few buyers. Suppliers with low capabilities are 
more likely to work in a captive relationship, where they are beholden to a large buyer. 
Supplier governance types have an ambiguous relationship with many characteristics because 
they share the sign of a marginal effect with at least one other type. We obtain many more 
unambiguous sign predictions if we make pairwise comparisons between two types, and the 
estimated effect are in line with predictions in almost all cases. A key takeaway from the 
analysis is thus that it is possible to distinguish different “buy” relationships and that the 
predictive power of our variables extend from the make-or-buy decision to how-to-buy. 
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Another takeaway is that even complex components are only produced in-house if both 
codifiability (the TCE variable) and supplier capability (the PRT variable) are low. If only 
one of these dimensions is problematic, outsourcing is still feasible, but the collaboration 
with suppliers will take a particular form. 
Our findings relate to those three literatures that show transactions to be more easily 
outsourceable if they possess a certain feature. The results for complexity complement 
Maskin and Tirole (1999) who show that the ability to redefine transactions such that they 
are describable by contracts facilitates outsourcing. It also relates to Bajari and Tadelis (2001) 
who show that the contract choice, fixed-price or cost-plus, depends on the feasibility of 
providing the supplier with a comprehensive design. The results for codifiability complement 
Monteverde and Teece (1982) and Levin and Tadelis (2010) who show that high transaction 
costs of contracting makes it harder for cities to privatize a service. And our results on 
supplier capabilities complement the insurance example in Grossman and Hart (1986) or 
Woodruff (2002) who finds that segments with high fashion turnover see greater prominence 
of independent stores that need to expend effort learning about this season’s demand.5 
We build on the literature, mostly in management and geography, that studies the range 
of sourcing arrangements between the extremes of make-or-buy. Powell (1990) and Ménard 
(2013) highlight the varied forms of firm interaction one can observe and how various 
theories simultaneously influence firms’ decisions. Bensaou (1999) and Gereffi, Humphrey, 
and Sturgeon (2005) propose a particular typology of organization modes. Our analysis is 
particularly close to the last approach which has been used as a framework to study the 
organization of industries in a myriad of settings. We illustrate how the three characteristics 
that they consider as determinants of governance modes can be directly related to prominent 
theories in economics. Our empirical work can be considered a cross-industry (or cross-
product) confirmation of the case study evidence that has accumulated in that literature.6 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the theoretical 
framework that guides the analysis. In Section 3 we present the data and in Section 4 the 
                                                 
5  Lafontaine and Slade (2009) provide a broad overview of the empirical literature. 
6 The website www.globalvaluechains.org lists 1,063 sources (as of July 18, 2017), including 445 journal 
articles, 52 books, and 133 book chapters, that study the organization of global value chains. Most of them 
(966) are case studies that are classified by industry. Clothing/apparel and food industries are researched most 
intensely, but 42 industries are covered by at least 5 studies.  
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empirical model. Section 5 contains a discussion of the estimation results and implications 
and conclusions are presented in Section 6.  
2. Framework 
2.1 Conditional predictions 
When empirical papers establish a link between an explanatory variable of interest and 
firms’ choices to outsource an input or not, it should be interpreted as a conditional 
prediction, as illustrated in Table 2. For example, we only expect a positive relationship 
between engineering intensity and the make-or-buy decision in Monteverde and Teece 
(1982) if other conditions are satisfied as well. In particular, the contribution of supplier 
investments to this engineering effort should not be so large, to make in-house production 
entirely inefficient due to the diminished investment incentives for the supplier. If supplier 
investments were all that mattered in the creation of surplus, it would be prohibitively costly 
not to make the supplier a residual claimant and the make-option would never be chosen. 
Moreover, the engineering efforts should not be verifiable or the requirements of satisfactory 
performance too complex to specify contractually. Otherwise, a well-designed contract could 
obviate the need for changing the organizational form. 
Joskow (1985)’s study of the impact of transaction costs on contracting arrangements 
between electricity generators and coal suppliers explicitly mentions similar assumptions that 
are often implicit. Focusing on various dimensions of asset specificity, he finds that most 
generators rely on contractual restrictions and pricing arrangements to split the surplus and 
provide adequate performance incentives. Only in the most extreme circumstances, as in the 
case of mine-mouth generation plants, does asset specificity lead to vertical integration. Even 
here, it requires low uncertainty regarding mine productivity, because an internal mining 
division would be subject to moral hazard and underprovide effort. It further requires that 
contractual remedies, such as increasing the contract length or boosting purchase 
commitments are insufficient to make arm’s length collaboration self-sustainable. The 
alternative to vertical integration is definitely not only to transact on spot markets governed 
by price competition. 
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Table 2:  Examples of make-or-buy in the (empirical) literature 
Ex-post transaction 
costs 
Dominant marginal 
returns 
Contracts / Complexity Make or Buy 
prediction 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) TCE, e.g. Monteverde and Teece (1982), Joskow (1985) 
High Not supplier Incomplete / High Make 
Low Not supplier Incomplete / High Buy 
(b) PRT, e.g. Antràs (2003), Nunn and Trefler (2013), Van Biesebroeck and Zhang (2015) 
High Buyer Incomplete / High Make 
High Supplier Incomplete / High Buy 
(c) Contracting flexibility, e.g. Bajari and Tadelis (2001), Levin and Tadelis (2010) 
Intermediate Intermediate A choice / High Buy  Cost-plus 
Intermediate Intermediate variable / Low Buy  Fixed-price 
 
Applications that find support for the PRT predictions also make implicit assumptions. 
For example, Antràs (2003) finds a positive relationship at the industry level between the 
fraction of international trade transactions taking place within firm boundaries and the capital 
intensity. In his model, firms’ headquarters provide the capital inputs in production and 
choose to conduct transactions with an arm’s length supplier or through a foreign subsidiary. 
A high capital intensity indicates that the supplier’s contribution to surplus creation is low 
and there is less need to choose an outside supplier that has better investment incentives. This 
prediction is conditional on the inability to contractually specify, monitor and enforce input 
provision by the outside supplier or the in-house division. The ex-post control that ownership 
provides is necessary to provide incentives. At the same time, it has to be the case that the 
two parties are bound together and cannot easily go their own way if negotiations break 
down, i.e. the sunk investments are transaction-specific.7 Nunn and Trefler (2013) verify this 
maintained hypothesis in Antràs (2003) by measuring the relative capital intensity of the 
buyer’s versus the supplier’s industry using only a subset of the capital stock. They show that 
building-intensity does not predict vertical integration, but machinery-intensity does. 
                                                 
7 Lileeva and Van Biesebroeck (2013) highlight the distinction between the specificity of investments, 
which influence the size of the surplus the firms bargain over, and the ease of appropriation of sunk investments 
by the controlling firm, which influences the impact of ownership on the relative bargaining position. The 
organizational form only depends on the relative marginal contributions of the two firms if specificity is 
sufficiently high and ease of appropriation is high enough, but not perfect as it would entirely destroy incentives 
for an in-house divisions. 
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The international trade literature contains many more examples that rely on the PRT to 
generate predictions on the structure of trade or on the decision to offshore an input. Van 
Biesebroeck and Zhang (2014) relate the maturity of a product to the likelihood of foreign 
sourcing, assuming that production processes become less high-skill (design) intensive and 
more low-skill (production) intensive as products mature. As low-skill inputs become more 
important, the cost advantage of producing in a low-wage country eventually becomes 
crucial. They again assume that inputs are transaction specific and ex-post transaction costs 
are high, which is not implausible for automobile parts that are often customized, and that 
contractual solutions to provide investment incentives are difficult to enforce internationally. 
Such implicit conditions are equally important in other contexts that study the 
determinants of organizational form. For example, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) consider 
alternative contracting options in construction where the buyer can provide a comprehensive 
design at a cost. Sometimes, e.g. for simple projects, it is optimal to provide such design and 
sign a fixed-price contract which makes the contractor the residual claimant. It reduces ex-
post transaction costs, but raises the ex-ante costs of the buyer. For more complex projects, 
providing a comprehensive design, i.e. completing the contract, becomes too costly. A buyer 
will instead offer a cost-plus contract, where future adjustments are simply compensated and 
the buyer remains residual claimant. Modeling the trade-off between the two alternative 
contracts, fixed-price or cost-plus, as a function of the complexity of the project implicitly 
assumes that it is inefficient for the buyer to bring the project in-house and hire the contractor 
as an employee and that these contracts can be enforced without holdup and costly delays. 
In another example, Levin and Tadelis (2010) model outsourcing of city services as 
determined by the difficulty of specifying, enforcing, and adjusting performance standards. 
They implicitly assume that the city employees have the ability to perform the service in-
house and that the cost of switching to an alternative service provider is too high to be a 
viable threat to provide performance incentives without having to move production in-house. 
Many studies explicitly discuss the necessary conditions for the prediction of interest to 
hold, but in the empirical work they are often ignored or assumed to be satisfied in the specific 
setting chosen for the analysis. As we want to learn in which circumstances alternative 
theories apply or which model generates the most powerful predictions, it becomes necessary 
to condition explicit on other factors. In addition, we anticipate that variables that are able to 
predict the make-or-buy decision when some complementary assumptions are satisfied, do 
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not lose their predictive power entirely in other circumstances. Table 3 contains two 
examples that illustrate how we can extend the reasoning behind make-or-buy predictions to 
generate predictions on the nature of collaboration with external suppliers. 
Consider first the TCE logic. When the buyer provides at least some of the (transaction-
specific) investments, in-house production is a possibility and it will be chosen if the ex-post 
transaction costs are sufficiently high. The sourcing of automotive parts in Monteverde and 
Teece (1982) did require some buyer investment (by the nature of the final product) and 
engineering effort was a reasonable proxy for the magnitude of ex-post transaction costs. 
This situation is depicted in the first two lines of Table 3. 
If, however, the supplier or the in-house component division has to provide all 
engineering effort, in-house production would be highly inefficient in terms of lost incentives 
for the supply division. We expect such components to be outsourced, but still expect that 
the extent of ex-post transaction costs influences the nature of the relationship between the 
buyer and supplier. With high costs, the buyer is likely to interact closely with the supplier 
to facilitate the resolution of any conflicts that might arise when changes need to be 
implemented. In the data, it will be recorded as an outsourced input, but even though the 
supplier is an independent legal entity, in practice it can operate with some of the features of 
an in-house division.  
Table 3:  Forms of governance when contracts are incomplete 
Ex-post transaction 
costs 
Dominant marginal 
returns 
Theory predicts Data 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) TCE logic: 
High Buyer  Make Make 
Low Buyer  Buy (Captive) Buy 
    
High Supplier  Make-like (Relational) Buy 
Low Supplier  Buy* Buy 
(b) PRT logic: 
High Buyer  Make Make 
High Supplier  Buy (Relational) Buy 
    
Low Buyer  Make-like (Captive) Buy 
Low Supplier  Buy* Buy 
Note: * When the PRT and TCE logic agrees, buyers will form Market or Modular relationships (see below). 
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All carmakers tend to have several preferred tier-1 suppliers that they collaborate with 
repeatedly on many of their models. Buyers and suppliers station some of their employees at 
each other’s premises, they coordinate their IT systems in order to facilitate joint design and 
just-in-time, even just-in-sequence deliveries to the assembly line. From a TCE perspective 
such a relationship is not all that different from making a part in-house. We will call this 
option a Relational mode of governance with an external supplier.8 
A similar reasoning is possible from a PRT perspective. If ex-post transaction costs are 
high, the relative importance of investments will have predictive power for the make-or-buy 
decision. The importance of transaction costs makes close and repeated collaboration 
preferable, but only when the buyer investment dominates will it be optimal to bring the 
activity in-house. If suppliers make all crucial investments, an external supply relationship is 
preferable to give stronger investment incentives. Collaboration will still be close, however, 
leading to the Relational mode of governance.  
In the reverse situation, when ex-post transaction costs are low, it will not be worthwhile 
to bring the transaction in-house. When the buyer makes the most important investments, it 
will look for ways to adjust the supplier relationship to help safeguard its investments and 
increase its bargaining position. One way to achieve this is by prohibiting the supplier to 
work for other firms.9 Even though the supplier has control over its own investments, it has 
no ongoing relationships with other carmakers that could provide an outside option to use as 
bargaining chip in a negotiation. From the PRT perspective such a Captive relationship gives 
the buyer almost the same benefits as vertical integration.  
In situations where the two theories give opposing predictions, we expect inputs to be 
outsourced, but the form of supplier governance to match the situation. If only the PRT logic 
suggests in-house production because buyer investments dominate, suppliers can be made 
captive, a make-like form of buying from the perspective of bargaining power. If only the 
                                                 
8 Helper (1991) describes how the US automotive industry has gone from very close collaboration between 
carmakers and suppliers at the start of the twentieth century, and again starting in the 1980s, while the 
intervening post-war period was characterized by greater prominence of in-house production and arm’s length 
relationships with the remaining outside suppliers. The close collaboration was characterized by intense 
exchange of information and long-term relationships with outside suppliers.  
9 Ahmadjian and Oxley (2011) describe the close collaboration in the Japanese automotive industry where 
carmakers often take an equity position in their suppliers, but also help close suppliers to smooth production if 
demand fluctuates. 
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TCE logic suggests in-house production because ex-post transaction costs and the risk of 
holdup is large, we expect a tight, collaborative relationship with the supplier. Even though 
it is an independent firm, the collaboration is structured as with an in-house division to 
facilitate conflict resolution and adaptation. 
2.2 Choosing between many forms of governance 
When contracts are incomplete, firms can structure collaborations with their suppliers in 
a way suit the situation, broadening their options beyond the simple make-or-buy dichotomy. 
The four possibilities in Table 3 all assume that contracts are incomplete and we show them 
as a straightforward 2-by-2 trade-off in the top panel of Table 4. 
When transactions are not too complex and ex-post transaction cost considerations or 
investment incentives can be dealt with contractually, or firms can modify features of 
transactions to make them contractible, firms have even more options. Rather than tailor the 
supplier governance to the situation, they can tailor the contract. In the bottom panel of Table 
4, we show choices between different contracts in the same framework. As we do not observe 
contract choices in our dataset, in the empirical analysis we combine all buyer-supplier 
relationships governed by appropriate contracts into a single Market type of relationship.  
Table 4:  Different relationships by contract or by organizational form 
   Ex-post transaction costs (TCE) 
   High Low 
Incomplete 
contracts 
Dominant 
Marginal 
Returns 
(PRT) 
Buyer Make 
Buy 
(Captive) 
Supplier 
Buy 
(Relational) 
Buy 
(Modular) 
   
 “Buy” at fixed price Ex-post transaction costs (TCE) 
   High Low 
Complete 
contracts 
Dominant 
Marginal 
Returns 
(PRT) 
Buyer Contract  
specifies 
conditional 
obligations 
Spot market 
Supplier 
Performance 
contract 
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If every single aspect of a transaction makes in-house production unnecessary—(i) 
complexity is low and contracting is possible, (ii) the supplier makes the key investments, 
and (iii) ex-post transaction costs are low, for example because assets are not transaction-
specific—the buyer can simply purchase inputs on the spot market. If supplier investments 
are more important, but still verifiable, they can be described in a performance contract. It 
specifies the necessary effort or investment by the supplier necessary to achieve the desired 
input quality and the buyer only pays when contractual obligations are met. If ex-post 
transaction costs are high, the risk of holdup can be resolved by contractually specifying the 
conditional obligations of both buyer and supplier in all states of the world. If the transaction 
is sufficiently simple that the relevant uncertainties that could trigger a need for adjustments 
can be anticipated, the appropriate response can also be anticipated and included in the 
contract. 
Naturally, dealing contractually with investment incentives and potential holdup is 
limited. Contractibility is determined by the complexity of the transaction and complete 
contracts will only be available for relatively simple transactions. If complexity is too high 
and a complete contract is not available, the buyer will need to tailor its relationship with the 
supplier to achieve satisfactory collaboration, as discussed earlier. 
In principle, a relational contract can replace a formal contract (Baker, Gibbons and 
Murphy 2002). Rather than relying on an outside court for enforcement, the value in the 
ongoing relationship serves to self-enforce to contract. Payments can be specified to reward 
the supplier even for actions that are not verifiable by outsiders and the supplier will comply 
as long as the benefit of deviating from this implicit contract is lower than the expected net 
present value of the future stream of payoffs within the relationship. Naturally, such a 
relational contract is limited to situations where both parties’ interests diverge not too far and 
also not their assessments of the future value of the relationship. 
Our predictions are closely related to the highly influential theory of Gereffi et al. (2005) 
on governance in global value chains (GVC). They rely on distinct literatures from 
management and economic geography, but we can line up our predictions with theirs. They 
start from three characteristics of a transaction: (i) how easy it is to objectively define 
performance characteristics, (ii) the (technological) capabilities present in the supply base, 
and (iii) the complexity of a transaction.  
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The TCE notion of ex-post transaction costs is represented in the GVC theory by the 
codifiability of performance requirements. If it is possible to describe and for an outside court 
to verify whether an input meets the required quality, is reliable, and is delivered on time,… 
ex-post transaction costs will be low as the supply contract can specify these performance 
features rather than the product characteristics or the suppliers’ actions and investments. 
While the nature of the production process might still bind the buyer and supplier together, 
e.g. due to transaction-specific assets, the residual claims when adjustments need to be made 
can be assigned in advance by explicitly determining the performance requirements. If a 
technological change or unanticipated difficulty makes a component fall short of its required 
performance, the supplier will need to absorb the necessary adjustment costs. If a design 
change in the rest of the vehicle requires an adjustment in the functionality of a component, 
the supplier will need to be compensated for this. If such adjustments or the costs they will 
entail are difficult to predict, codifiability is low and ex-post transactions costs are high. 
The key predictor in the PRT is the marginal return of a supplier’s investment to the joint 
surplus relative to the marginal return of the buyer’s investment. It is replaced in the GVC 
theory by the existence or not of strong capabilities in the supply base, which need to be 
judged relative to the requirements of the transaction as is the case for the other dimensions. 
Capabilities are also deemed to be low if a buyer provides some crucial input and supplier 
investments cannot substitute for this, for example due to informational differences. While 
the PRT explicitly considers the relative importance and focuses on marginal effects in terms 
of surplus creation, the existence of a supply base with sufficient capabilities is more of an 
equilibrium consideration. If supplier investments are dominant and independent suppliers 
are incentivized, we expect the supply base to generate the necessary capabilities.  
If all three characteristics can take a high or a low value, it leads to eight possible 
situations that in principle each require a distinct optimal type of governance. Gereffi et al. 
(2005) argue, however, that the first two dimensions loose much of their importance if 
transactions are not complex, in which case they are satisfied almost automatically. This is 
similar to our argument that the completeness of a contract is inversely related to the 
complexity of a transaction. The GVC theory predicts that low complexity by itself will lead 
to market transactions, irrespective of the codifiability or capabilities. In our case, we do not 
observe firms’ contract choices and cannot distinguish between the different situations in the 
bottom panel of Table 4 from the patterns in the buyer-supplier interactions. Hence, we study 
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the same five governance types that the GVC theory considers and we already borrowed their 
terminology of governance types as listed in the first column of Table 5.  
Table 5:  Predictions of the Global Value Chains theory of Gereffi et al. (2005) 
 
 
↓ 
GVC terminology of 
governance types 
Contract 
incompleteness 
↓ 
Complexity 
of the transaction 
 
Inverse of ex-post 
transaction costs 
↓ 
Codifiability 
of performance 
requirements 
Supplier marginal 
returns 
↓ 
Capability 
of the supply base 
 
Market Low N/A (High*) N/A (High*) 
Modular High High High 
Relational High Low High 
Captive High High Low 
Hierarchy High Low Low 
Note: * High codifiability and High supplier capability for Market governance has to be interpreted in light of 
the Low complexity of the transaction.  They are not necessarily higher than the low values that are indicated 
for either dimension further below in the table in the case of complex transactions. 
We call the group of non-complex transactions or situations that can be governed by 
appropriate contracts Market transactions. At the other extreme are in-house transactions, 
governed by Hierarchy; and the Relational and Captive governance modes have already been 
discussed. The one governance type left to discuss is Modular, where complexity is high, but 
supplier capabilities and performance codifiability are high as well. The complexity makes 
spot market transactions unattractive, but both the TCE and PRT characteristics favor 
outsourcing. The supplier should have control over its investment to elicit high effort, or put 
differently, the unique capabilities in the supply base are more important for component 
quality than the buyer’s inputs. Low asset specificity or a low likelihood of requiring future 
adaptations limit the ex-post transaction costs, or put differently, the buyer can specify 
requirements in terms of well-defined performance standards, leaving the supplier to decide 
on the actions, investments, and technology choices to meet these standards. Sturgeon (2002) 
describes how the nature of buyer-supplier interaction in the electronics industry often fits 
this situation. The nature of technology in this industry, e.g. the ability to exchange electronic 
files that specify designs and interconnections, facilitates collaboration on highly complex 
components through arm’s length supply relationships. 
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3. Data 
Because the empirical model is shaped to a large extent by the available data, we first 
describe the structure and content of our unique transaction-level dataset. It is based on 
information of supply contracts for individual parts or larger components in the automotive 
industry. The data comes from SupplierBusiness, a consulting firm, and covers transactions 
from models that entered production between 1993 and 2012. It includes all major carmakers 
and global first-tier suppliers. In addition, it includes contracts awarded to more than a 
thousand small and medium size supplier firms located in Europe and North America.  
In total, we observe 64 unique buyers, defined as an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) in one of the two regions, Europe or North America.10 We further observe 2,205 
unique suppliers, defined as the product division of a supplier firm in one of the two major 
geographic regions. Finally, contracts are observed for 350 models and 213 unique parts, 
which are defined by SupplierBusiness using a nested component classification system.  A 
unit of observation in our analysis is a transaction, i.e. a unique combination of a buyer, a 
supplier, and a product. We only observe a subset of transactions, but with 57,354 
observations out of a potential total of 74,550 (350 x 213) coverage is relatively complete. 
In the analysis we use four dependent variables, which each proxy for a different type of 
supplier governance. They are constructed based on market shares within all observed 
transactions along various dimensions, e.g. by supplier, by buyer, by product,... Two of the 
key explanatory variables (codifiability and complexity) are constructed based solely on the 
structure of the parts classification. The construction of the dependent variables and 
explanatory variables of interest are described in detail in the next section. We include 
contract length, as proxied by the number of months between the start and end of production 
of a car model, as control variable in the regressions. Longer contracts can indicate greater 
uncertainty in a buyer-supplier relation (Joskow, 1985). 
                                                 
10 We observe 15 unique ultimate owners, which generally sell vehicles under multiple brands and in both 
regions. While vehicles marketed under different brands are sometimes based on common platforms, they are 
largely designed separately and most of the sourcing decisions on parts are taken at the brand level. Exports of 
vehicles between Europe and North America are relatively unimportant as most vehicles are assembled in the 
region where they are sold. Hence, we consider Ford-Europe and Ford-North America as separate buyers, and 
similarly for Volkswagen-Europe and Audi-Europe. 
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To construct the third explanatory variable of interest (capability) and additional control 
variables, we added firm-level information on OEMs and suppliers from Amadeus, a database 
with complete coverage of European firms. The matching process to the contracting data is 
described in more detail in Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2013). The Amadeus database 
contains balance sheet information, address information, and a detailed industry 
classification. Unfortunately, the sample is reduced quite substantially as we are only able to 
match the suppliers in 16,548 of the observations. 
Geographic proximity is known to play an important part in both the decision to outsource 
and the choice of individual suppliers (Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck, 2013). We therefore 
include the distance from the closest supplier plant to the model’s assembly plant, and from 
this supplier plant to the administrative office of the OEM. In addition, we include a dummy 
variable for the presence of a country border between the two plants, which is an important 
variable in the analysis of foreign direct investment. Cultural, historic, or institutional ties 
can also play a role in the organization of outsourcing relationships. We include a variable 
of cultural distance measured at the country level based on the locations of the headquarters 
of the supplier and buyer. The index is calculated using the survey data of Hofstede (1980) 
as the Mahalanobis distance over four dimensions: individualism, power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. 
We experimented with several variables to control for the production technology of the 
supplier, such as the total number of workers at a supplier, its capital intensity, measured as 
the total value of assets per worker at the plant, and a proxy for value added, defined as 
operating revenues over total assets. As the first two variables almost invariably became 
statistically insignificant if the third variable was included, we only retained that one.  
4. Empirical model and variable construction 
4.1 Empirical model 
If the various governance types (indexed by k) could be unambiguously identified, as is 
the case when studying the make-or-buy decision, one could simply estimate a multinomial 
logit model at the transaction level, linking the probability of each type to the explanatory 
variables of interest: 
𝑃𝑟[type = 𝑘] ~𝑓(𝛽1𝑘* 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽2𝑘* 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑘* 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠). 
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Unfortunately, as governance types are not directly recorded, we need to rely on 
observable proxies to identify them. It might even be the case that a buyer-supplier 
relationship is of an intermediate form and does not correspond exactly to one of the 
governance types listed in Table 5. Therefore, we do not partition relationships exhaustively 
in four groups, but we calculate for each transaction four continuous variables that we argue 
to be monotonically related to one of the governance types. Note that transactions that use 
hierarchy or in-house production (the fifth governance form) are by construction excluded 
from our sample. We base the proxy variables on the extensive set of case studies in the 
global value chains literature that describe differences in organizational forms and the 
environments most suited for each form. The regressions we estimate take the following 
form: 
𝑦𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝
𝑘 = 𝛽1𝑘* 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑘* 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑘* 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝,     (1) 
with 𝑦𝑘 = {𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑝, 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑏 , 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑏𝑝, 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑏}. The dependent and 
explanatory variables vary at the levels indicated by the subscripts in equation (1) and we 
describe in the next sub-sections how they are constructed and what motivated these choices. 
We will estimate four sets of coefficients 𝛽1,  𝛽2, and  𝛽3, one for each governance type, 
using the full sample of transactions defined by the buyer, model, supplier, and product 
(bmsp).11 When we use one dependent variable, say 𝑦𝑘 = 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡, all transactions that are 
sourced using one of the three non-market types are expected to have relatively low values 
for this dependent value. Only when a characteristic is high for market and low for all other 
types, or vice versa, do we expect a systematic relationship between the characteristic and 
the dependent variable for market. From Table 5 we see that this is for example the case for 
complexity, which is expected to be low for market and high for captive, relational, and 
modular, and we expect a negative sign on the complexity variable in the market regression. 
It is not the case for codifiability or capability, which are expected to be high for market 
transactions, but also for some of the other types of transactions, and we have no clear sign 
predictions for them. The only other unambiguous sign predictions are a negative effect on 
capability in the captive regression and on codifiability in the relational regression. 
                                                 
11 Note that observations are identified by bm—a specific model produced by a buyer—but explanatory 
and control variables only use information on the buyers, ignoring individual models. In the construction of the 
dependent variables we always sum over all models produced by a buyer. 
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Pairwise comparisons between types generates several more unambiguous predictions. 
For example, if we had a way to limit the sample to only market and captive transactions, we 
would additionally expect a positive relationship between capability and the likelihood of a 
market transaction because the theory predicts 𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 > 𝛽3𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒. One way to investigate 
these pairwise predictions is to take the difference between the equations for two governance 
types and estimate regressions of this form:  
𝑦𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝
𝑘 − 𝑦𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝
𝑙 = (𝛽1𝑘 − 𝛽1𝑙)* 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝 + (𝛽2𝑘 − 𝛽2𝑙)* 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑝                 
+ (𝛽3𝑘 − 𝛽3𝑙)* 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜖?̃?𝑚𝑠𝑝.                 (2) 
For example, using as dependent variable (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑝 − 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑏) makes it possible to 
test whether the prediction (𝛽3𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 − 𝛽3𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒) > 0 holds. 
Alternatively, we can also make pairwise comparisons if we assign each transaction to 
either of the two types, depending on the value it attains in the distribution of the two 
dependent variables. Pairwise comparisons can then simply be performed with a probit 
regression on the sub-sample of transactions assigned to one of the two types under 
consideration. To avoid misclassifying transactions where the best fit with either of the two 
types is ambiguous, we omit transactions that have values above the median of the dependent 
variable for both types or have values below the median for both variables. We only keep 
transactions with a high value for one dependent variable and a low value for the other. We 
then estimate the following probit regression: 
    𝑃𝑟[𝑦𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝
𝑘 > 𝑝50%
𝑘   &  𝑦𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝
𝑙 < 𝑝50%
𝑙 ] =                                                                              
𝛷(𝛽1𝑘𝑙* 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝛽2𝑘𝑙* 𝑐𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑝 + 𝛽3𝑘𝑙* 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠),       (3) 
with Φ(. ) the normal distribution function and 𝑝50%
𝑘  the median value for variable 𝑦𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝
𝑘  
and similarly for type l. The sample excludes transactions where 𝑦𝑘 and 𝑦𝑙 are on the same 
side of their respective medians. 
4.2 Dependent variables 
To define the dependent variables that proxy for governance types in supplier sourcing, 
we exploit the relative frequency that transactions in the dataset involve the same buyer, 
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supplier, or product, or the same buyer-supplier combination, etc. We could calculate these 
market shares simply by counting transactions, which gives the variables the interpretation 
of a probability. However, effects for the explanatory variables of interest were estimated 
more precisely, but almost always with the same sign, if we weighted each transaction by the 
projected total production volume of the model at the time of the contract (𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝). 
We need a proxy variable that is monotonically increasing in the likelihood that a 
transaction is of a given governance type.  As we want an approach that works generically, 
we propose a ratio of two shares for each governance type, where the case literature has 
guided us in the selection of the different shares in the numerator or denominator. Intuitively, 
we aim to measure how concentrated contracting is along the dimension intuitively most 
closely connected with a particular governance type and normalize this by the concentration 
along some other dimension.12  
The different market shares that enter these calculations, which are listed in the third 
column of Table 6, are the total market shares of the buyer, seller, or product over the entire 
market (𝜎𝑏, 𝜎𝑠 and 𝜎𝑝), the market share of a particular buyer-supplier pair over all products 
they exchange (𝜎𝑏𝑠), and the same share limited to a single product p (𝜎𝑏𝑠𝑝), but still summing 
over all models.  The reasoning why a large value of each dependent variable maps into a 
high likelihood for a particular governance type is discussed in turn. 
Table 6:  Definitions of the dependent variables that proxy for the form of governance 
Governance 
type 
Interpretation Definition 
 
Captive Supplier s has a low market share while 
buyer b has a high market share.  
− ln
𝜎𝑠
𝜎𝑏
= ln
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑚
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑏
 
Relational The specific buyer-product relationship bp 
accounts only for a small fraction of the 
total market share of supplier s.  
− ln
𝜎𝑏𝑠𝑝
𝜎𝑠
= ln
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑏
∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑚
 
Modular Supplier s has a relatively high market 
share compared to the set of products 
(‘module’) that it supplies to a buyer b.  
+ ln
𝜎𝑠
𝜎𝑏𝑠
= ln
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑏
∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚
 
Market A low market share for supplier s relative 
to the total market share of product p. 
− ln
𝜎𝑠
𝜎𝑝
= ln
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑠𝑚𝑏
∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑞𝑏𝑚𝑠𝑝𝑝𝑚𝑏
 
                                                 
12 As we divide two market shares in each definition, the implicit normalization of the summed quantities 
in the denominator of both shares always cancel out. 
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Note: The subscripts bmsp stand for buyer, model, supplier, and product, respectively. The sum of quantities in 
the numerators and denominators become market shares after dividing by the quantity for the entire market. 
Captive relationships will be characterized by a small market share for the supplier 
relative to the buyer it sells to, i.e. 𝜎𝑠/𝜎𝑏 is low and the negative of the logarithm of this 
relative market share—the dependent variable shown in Table 6—is high (Ahmadjian and 
Oxley, 2006).13 In Relational governance the supplier is independent and sought after for its 
unique expertise. This expertise tends to be at the level of a product which is often uniquely 
tailored to a buyer’s needs (Bensaou, 1999; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011). As a result, the 
share of each buyer-product share in the supplier’s overall sales is limited, i.e. 𝜎𝑏𝑠𝑝/𝜎𝑠 is low 
(Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck, and Gereffi, 2008). A supplier will operate with the same 
independence in Modular relationships, but here one particular product can account for a 
large share of a supplier’s market share (Sturgeon, 2002). The entire business of each buyer 
will still account for a relative small fraction of a supplier’s overall market share, but 
individual components might dominate a buyer-supplier relationship (Humphrey, 2003). 
Market relationships will have low supplier market shares relative to the overall product 
market (Stigler, 1951). Competition is high for relatively common products. 
 Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the mean and standard deviations of all dependent 
variables, as well as for the explanatory and control variables. 
4.3 Explanatory variables 
We also need proxies for the three characteristics of transactions: codifiability, 
complexity, and capability. Importantly, we use information on the type of component or 
supplier, but not on the buyer or the buyer-supplier interaction, as that information was used 
to construct the dependent variables. It mirrors the approach in the seminal study of 
Monteverde and Teece (1982) who used expert surveys to independently assess the 
engineering requirements of the design and production of car components as a predictor of 
outsourcing decision. 
                                                 
13 In some industries, e.g. the apparel industry, supply chains can be buyer-driven leading to captive 
upstream suppliers, or producer-driven leading to captive downstream retailers (Gereffi, 1999). In the 
automotive sector only the former type is relevant.  
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Complexity 
To ascertain whether a part is complex or not, we exploit the hierarchical structure of the 
component classification as defined by the data provider, SupplierBusiness. We measure the 
complexity of individual parts by the number of sub-categories contained in the module that 
the part belongs to. Our objective is not to capture the technological complexity of 
production, but the extent and intensity of interactions with the buyer and with other suppliers 
working on parts that need to be assembled into the same module. If such linkages are 
extensive, suppliers face more uncertainty about possible future modifications. It makes it 
more difficult to incorporate all eventualities in a contract or makes it more costly to provide 
a complete design, in the language Bajari and Tadelis (2001).14 
We count the number of sub-categories in each module and all parts that belong to that 
module receive the same value.15 As we do not want to give this simple count a cardinal 
interpretation of complexity, we stick close to the theory and map the complexity proxy into 
a dummy variable that indicates whether a value is below or above the sample median. Table 
A.1 in the Appendix shows the means and standard deviations of all three explanatory 
variables. 58% of transactions involve products that are part of a complex module. It differs 
from an exact 50-50 split because approximately 10% of the transactions in the dataset have 
a number of sub-categories exactly equal to the median value. 
Codifiability 
Levi, Kleindorfer and Wu (2003) provide a useful, but narrow definition of codifiability 
as “the ability to precisely characterize in electronic format the nature of the product/service 
contracted for, including delivery requirements and any other contractual/fulfillment 
requirements that may pertain to a specific transaction, in a manner understandable to 
relevant parties.” (Levi et al., 2003, p. 79) This has two dimensions: (i) the codifiability of 
the component as such and (ii) the codifiability of its interfaces with other parts of the car.” 
                                                 
14 One way to alleviate uncertainty would be through product standards, hence we predict different 
governance approaches for complex transactions depending on the codifiability. 
15 An even simpler indicator we experimented with classifies components as either stand-alone parts or as 
sub-assemblies or larger modules that consist of several parts and need to be assembled themselves.  Results 
were qualitatively similar using this alternative measure of complexity. 
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More generally, a component is codifiable if the buyer is able to specify in advance and 
in a readily verifiable way the performance characteristics a part has to meet. The supplier 
will produce and possibly also design it by choosing cost-effective technologies and input 
bundles to meet performance requirements. If a part occurs in several sub-assemblies that 
occur in different places of a vehicle, it is not very specific to a single module or application.  
Such widespread use of a component makes it more likely to appear in several outsourcing 
relationships and standardization of its performance requirements will be more valuable. It 
can generate scale economies and increase competition. While the components might still be 
very complex, for example because they interact with many other parts, the standardization 
of functionality can make it less model-specific and lower the scope for ex-post holdup by 
the supplier and the buyer. 
To operationalize this insight, we again rely on hierarchical way the automotive experts 
of SupplierBusiness have organized the components in the dataset. Transactions are first 
classified into several broad areas, such as the engine, body & trim, interior, or chassis. 
Within each area there is a second level of sub-categories by function, called modules, such 
as a bumper, braking system, console, etc. In the third level of sub-categories, all components 
in a module are partitioned in unique categories that share few characteristics with other 
third-level components.  The more complex a module is, the more groups there are at this 
third level. Components with standardized characteristics are sometimes used in several 
modules (often produced by different suppliers), examples include bearings, gaskets, sensors, 
etc. One measure of codifiability is a simple count of the number of times a component occurs 
in distinct third-level sub-categories over the entire group of 350 models that we observe. To 
make the variable less sensitive to outliers and facilitate interpretation in the regressions, we 
again code it as one or zero, relative to the median value. 
We experimented with an alternative measure using information from outside our dataset.  
A component was classified as codifiable if it was covered by AUTOSAR (Automotive Open 
System Architecture). This is a collaboration of car assemblers and suppliers to develop open 
industry standards. The initiative addresses the rapidly increasing sophistication of electric 
and electronic systems in cars which limits the exchange of applications between assemblers 
and suppliers. An objective is to move away from proprietary solutions, prevalent in the car 
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industry, and to optimize the interfaces of and interactions between components.16 Results 
using this variable had almost always the same signs as the benchmark codifiability variable, 
but it reduced the sample size as not all components could be classified unambiguously. 
Capability 
The third explanatory variable to predict governance is supplier capability. As in the 
literature on equilibrium market dynamics, we measure it as the size of a supplier conditional 
on its age. That literature on market selection explains firms’ growth from differences in 
innate productivity which firms discover through their own market activities. More 
productive firms will gradually discover their ability, grow over time, and survive for a longer 
period. This selection mechanism is highly relevant for the evolution of the automotive 
industry over the last 20 years, as it has consolidated through mergers and supplier exit in the 
2008-2009 recession. The industry also globalized notably, which allowed the most efficient 
firms to increase in size (Sturgeon et al., 2008).  
Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) show that it is important to control for firm age 
when studying firm growth as firms need time to reach their desired size. A related literature 
on firm capability and learning argues that firms compete on the basis of internal resources 
that also take time to develop (Penrose, 1959). These capabilities are not only technological 
sophistication, but can be any skill that helps a firm prosper and survive, e.g. cost efficiency. 
As R&D expenditures also increase strongly with firm size, parts outsourced to large 
suppliers are more likely to require important investments on the suppliers’ side. 
We measure size using turnover (operating revenues in 2007) and divide by the age of 
the main EU branch or regional headquarters, both observed in the Amadeus dataset. We 
prefer to measure firm size by sales rather than R&D expenditures as the latter variable would 
also capture the complexity of the components a firm produces. We again make the variable 
binary by comparing it with the sample median. While the correlation between complexity 
and codifiability, which are both based only on the component classification, is relatively 
high, the capability measure is almost orthogonal to the other two variables. 
                                                 
16 Further information on the AUTOSAR initiative can be found at http://www.autosar.org/. 
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5. Results 
We now present the estimation results for the different dependent variables, starting with 
the effects estimated using equation (1). At the top of Table 7 we summarize the theoretical 
predictions on the relationships between each of the four types of governance and the three 
key explanatory variables. The shaded areas highlight the instances where there is an 
unambiguous sign prediction on the full sample of transactions. This occurs when only one 
governance type is associated with a low value of a characteristic. 
In the first panel with results, we only include the characteristic that can be 
unambiguously related to a governance type in the regressions. All three predictions are 
strongly supported. Market governance is negatively related to complexity, in line with the 
prediction that the other three governance modes are only chosen if complexity is high. 
Similarly, the captivity proxy is negatively related to supplier capability and the relational 
proxy negatively related to codifiability. Each of the three point estimates is significantly 
different from zero. There is no unambiguous prediction for modular governance, as at least 
one other governance type also predicts a high value for each of the three characteristics. 
Only modular and market relationships combine high capability and high codifiability, but 
in market relationships these characteristics are not necessarily high in an absolute sense, as 
transactions are not complex. We do find the proxy for modular governance to be positively 
correlated with a dummy variable for simultaneously high values of capability and 
codifiability. 
Results in the next panel confirm these findings for specifications that include all three 
explanatory variables simultaneously. The three shaded point estimates are slightly lower (in 
absolute value), but that is expected given the strong correlation between complexity and 
codifiability. For modular governance, all three signs are estimated to be positive, but only 
the complexity variable shows a statistically significant coefficient. Including all control 
variables in the regressions, results reported in the lowest panel, does not change any of the 
signs of interest and raises the statistical significance of several estimates. We now discuss 
the results in greater detail by governance type. 
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Table 7:  Results by governance type 
  Market Captive Relational Modular 
Complexity Low High High High 
Capability High Low High High 
Codifiability High High Low High 
      
 Market Captive Relational Modular 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) 
Complexity -0.628***    
 (0.0212)    
Capability  -0.0666**   
 
 (0.0265)   
Codifiability   -0.500***  
 
  (0.0298)  
Capability &    0.0721** 
    Codifiability    (0.0353) 
Observations 16,537 16,159 15,331 15,805 
      
 Market Captive Relational Modular 
  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) 
Complexity -0.545*** -0.458*** 0.373*** 0.0923** 
 (0.0325) (0.0424) (0.0427) (0.0360) 
Capability -0.00553 -0.0580** 0.0906*** 0.0358 
 (0.0201) (0.0263) (0.0261) (0.0223) 
Codifiability 0.119*** -0.0392 -0.192*** 0.00011 
 (0.0350) (0.0457) (0.0459) (0.0388) 
Observations 16,537 16,159 15,331 15,805 
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.015 0.023 0.001 
      
 Market Captive Relational Modular 
  (1c) (2c) (3c) (4c) 
Complexity -0.530*** -0.501*** 0.406*** 0.110*** 
 (0.0366) (0.0480) (0.0465) (0.0399) 
Capability -0.136*** -0.286*** 0.409*** 0.182*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0316) (0.0306) (0.0262) 
Codifiability 0.0675* -0.102** -0.121** 0.00372 
 (0.0391) (0.0512) (0.0496) (0.0425) 
Distance 0.0768*** -0.0221** -0.00303 -0.00921 
 (0.00734) (0.00961) (0.00935) (0.00796) 
Hofstede culture -0.117*** 0.380*** -0.260*** -0.586*** 
 (0.0232) (0.0304) (0.0294) (0.0252) 
Border effect 0.0712*** -0.000509 -0.00480 0.109*** 
 (0.0271) (0.0355) (0.0344) (0.0295) 
Contract length -0.00703*** -0.00335*** 0.0131*** 0.00739*** 
 (0.000588) (0.000771) (0.000748) (0.00064) 
Value added -0.0449*** -0.0351*** 0.0475*** 0.0170*** 
 (0.00194) (0.00254) (0.00245) (0.00210) 
Observations 12,341 12,341 12,241 12,241 
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Adjusted R2 0.133 0.051 0.096 0.071 
Note: Table 6 contains the definitions of the (continuous) dependent variables. Shaded areas refer to 
coefficients with theoretically unambiguous sign predictions. All regressions include a constant term (not 
reported). Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level.  
Market governance 
As discussed, the proxy for market governance shows a strong negative relationship with 
complexity, but the theory also predicts a high level of codifiability and high supplier 
capabilities. To some extent, this is almost by construction as the reverse would be difficult 
to imagine for transactions that are not complex. We do not have an unambiguous sign 
prediction for capability because transactions with a low value for the market proxy could be 
relational or modular, in which case capability is also predicted to be high. The same holds 
for the codifiability variable, modular or captive transactions are also predicted to have high 
codifiability. 
We resolve this ambiguity by making pairwise comparisons in in columns (4) and (5).. 
The theoretical predictions are again summarized at the top and unambiguous sign 
predictions, which are now a lot more numerous, are shaded. Results in panel (a) for estimates 
of equation (2) use the difference between two continuous governance proxies as dependent 
variable, while results in panel (b) use dummy dependent variables according to equation (3). 
There are only two instances where a sign differs in the two panels and the coefficients are 
never statistically significant. 
In the first column, we compare market explicitly to captive. In addition to the negative 
sign on complexity, as before, we now also find a positive sign on capability as captive 
suppliers are expected to have low capability. The positive effect is estimated very precisely 
in both panels. The effect on complexity, however, becomes insignificant if we compare 
explicitly with captive and even receives the wrong sign in panel (b). It suggests that 
transactions under market governance are much less complex than relational or modular 
transactions, but not so different from captive transactions. In column (2) we compare market 
explicitly to relational and we find the expected positive sign on codifiability. We already 
found this last effect in the unconditional comparison in Table 7, but the point estimates are 
now much higher, at 0.186 and 0.225 in the two panels, compared to 0.067 before. The results 
indicate that the ability to standardize non-complex components is especially high in 
comparison with transactions under close, relational governance. 
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Table 8:  Results for pairwise comparisons 
Theoretical predictions 
  
Market vs. 
Captive 
Market vs. 
Relational 
Market vs. 
Modular 
Captive vs. 
Relational 
Captive vs. 
Modular 
Modular vs. 
Relational 
Complexity Low v. High Low v. High Low v. High High High High 
Capability High v. Low High High Low v. High Low v. High High 
Codifiability High High v. Low High High v. Low High High v. Low 
       
(a) Estimation results for difference of (continuous) dependent variables 
 Market – 
Captive 
Market – 
Relational 
Market – 
Modular 
Captive – 
Relational 
Captive – 
Modular 
Modular – 
Relational 
  (1a) (2a) (3a) (4a) (5a) (6a) 
Complexity -0.0293 -0.940*** -0.639*** -0.911*** -0.606*** -0.289*** 
 (0.0434) (0.0735) (0.0609) (0.0884) (0.0831) (0.0300) 
Capability 0.151*** -0.544*** -0.319*** -0.704*** -0.481*** -0.232*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0483) (0.0400) (0.0581) (0.0546) (0.0197) 
Codifiability 0.169*** 0.186** 0.0654 0.0258 -0.0940 0.127*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0783) (0.0649) (0.0943) (0.0886) (0.0320) 
Distance 0.0989*** 0.0796*** 0.0855*** -0.0194 -0.0132 -0.00653 
 (0.00869) (0.0148) (0.0122) (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.00603) 
Hofstede culture -0.497*** 0.140*** 0.469*** 0.637*** 0.962*** -0.326*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0465) (0.0385) (0.0559) (0.0525) (0.0190) 
Border effect 0.0717** 0.0723 -0.0381 -0.0175 -0.122** 0.121*** 
 (0.0321) (0.0543) (0.0450) (0.0653) (0.0614) (0.0222) 
Contract length -0.00368*** -0.0201*** -0.0144*** -0.0163*** -0.0107*** -0.00578*** 
 (0.00070) (0.00118) (0.00098) (0.00142) (0.00133) (0.00048) 
Value added -0.00980*** -0.0923*** -0.0618*** -0.0833*** -0.0527*** -0.0304*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00387) (0.00321) (0.00466) (0.00439) (0.00158) 
Observations 12,341 12,241 12,290 12,241 12,290 12,241 
Adjusted-R2 0.051 0.130 0.105 0.078 0.059 0.108 
Note: The dependent variables are the pairwise differences between the dependent variables defined in Table 
6.  All specifications are estimated with OLS and include a constant term which is not reported.  Standard errors 
in brackets;  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
(b) Estimation results for discrete dependent variables 
 Market vs. 
Captive 
Market vs. 
Relational 
Market vs. 
Modular 
Captive vs. 
Relational 
Captive vs. 
Modular 
Modular vs. 
Relational 
  (1b) (2b) (3b) (4b) (5b) (6b) 
Complexity 0.0297 -0.458*** -0.316*** -0.441*** -0.278*** -0.568*** 
 (0.0700) (0.0458) (0.0485) (0.0422) (0.0425) (0.0910) 
Capability 0.384*** -0.219*** -0.106*** -0.381*** -0.245*** -0.497*** 
 (0.0448) (0.0312) (0.0331) (0.0286) (0.0284) (0.0549) 
Codifiability 0.347*** 0.225*** 0.166*** 0.0477 0.00355 0.147 
 (0.0728) (0.0489) (0.0520) (0.0452) (0.0454) (0.0954) 
Distance 0.152*** 0.0334*** 0.0544*** -0.0210** -0.00907 -0.0331* 
 (0.0164) (0.00903) (0.00987) (0.00871) (0.00865) (0.0177) 
Hofstede culture -0.378*** 0.0372 0.271*** 0.255*** 0.467*** -0.594*** 
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 (0.0441) (0.0306) (0.0330) (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0530) 
Border effect 0.0360 0.0358 -0.0432 0.0153 -0.0742** 0.217*** 
 (0.0528) (0.0356) (0.0373) (0.0325) (0.0325) (0.0654) 
Contract length -0.0051*** -0.0105*** -0.0098*** -0.0070*** -0.0059*** -0.00236 
 (0.0011) (0.00078) (0.00083) (0.00071) (0.00070) (0.00145) 
Value added -0.00685 -0.0380*** -0.0393*** -0.0369*** -0.0347*** -0.0249*** 
 (0.00530) (0.00289) (0.00326) (0.00251) (0.00263) (0.00447) 
Observations 3,705 8,857 7,501 9,862 9,556 2,816 
Quasi-R2 0.069 0.092 0.084 0.068 0.060 0.135 
Note: Reported statistics are coefficients estimates from probit regressions using dummy dependent variables 
as described in the text. All specifications include a constant term which is not reported. Standard errors in 
brackets;  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.  
Finally, the comparison between market and modular in column (3) shows again a strong 
negative sign on complexity. Both other characteristics should be high in both types of 
supplier relations, but the results indicate that supplier capabilities are especially high for 
modular, while codifiability is especially high for market. Both patterns are intuitive if we 
take into account that market transactions are less complex and more contractible. 
Some of the control variables also show intuitive patterns. In particular, market 
governance works best with long-distance relationships. Distance has a positive and 
significant coefficient in column (1c) of Table 7 and in columns (1)-(3) of Table 8. 
. Relationships that are governed by prices and contracts are more suitable for 
international trade and shipping over greater distances. Market governance is also 
systematically associated with contracts of shorter duration and contracts that generate lower 
value added. 
Captive governance 
Suppliers are more likely to be captive when their capabilities are low and that is indeed 
what we found. The relationship is stronger if control variables are included and also shows 
the predicted sign in all pairwise comparisons in Table 8. Note that all signs in column (1) of 
Table 8 would reverse if we had defined the dependent variable as (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑏 − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑝) 
instead of the actual definition, (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑝 − 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑏). The positive coefficient on 
capability in column (1) thus has the same interpretation as the negative coefficients on 
capability in columns (4) and (5). 
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While complexity and codifiability are also predicted to be high, the point estimates on 
these two characteristics are both negative in Table 7. It does not necessarily conflict with 
the theory as captive relationships share these predictions with other governance modes. The 
sign on codifiability turns positive in columns (4a) and (4b) of Table 8, in line with the 
prediction that captive governance is more likely than relational governance if codifiability 
is high. But the high standard errors suggest that the distinction is not very pronounced. As 
already mentioned, the sign on complexity has the predicted positive sign in column (1a), for 
the pairwise comparison of market against captive, but the opposite sign in column (1b) 
works against the prediction. In general, captive and market transactions in our sample do 
not seem all that different. Like market governance, transactions under captive governance 
show much lower complexity than relational or modular transactions. 
Three control variable with a systematically negative relationship with captive 
governance are all related to distance, both in terms of geography and national culture. 
Carmakers maintain much stronger control over suppliers based in culturally very distinct 
countries. The negative association with geographic distance and the presence of country 
borders is consistent with frequent co-location of captive suppliers with the assembly plant.   
Relational governance 
All results for relational governance correspond to the theoretical predictions. The 
negative coefficient on codifiability that we found in the initial regressions is confirmed by 
the six positive coefficients in columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 8.17 The initial regressions 
already showed an overall positive association between complexity and relational 
governance, but the pairwise comparisons show that complexity is higher for relational than 
for all three alternative governance types, not only for market. The same holds for 
capabilities. The theory predicts more capable suppliers in relational than in captive 
governance, but this even holds when comparing with the capabilities of market and modular 
suppliers. 
To some extent this is due to the nature of technology in the automotive sector. Helper 
(1991), Humphrey (2003), and Sturgeon et al. (2008) all describe the difficulty of outsourcing 
complex modules that are frequently tailored to individual models. The complexity stems not 
                                                 
17 In each of the three pairwise comparisons the dependent variable is defined to be low for relational 
governance. 
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only from customization, but also from interactions with other components in the vehicle, 
and the mechanical (as opposed to electronic) technology that makes it more difficult to 
exchange knowledge. Many of the case studies in the GVC literature discuss the automotive 
sector as a prime example where outsourcing of components requires close collaboration and 
frequent interactions. Carmakers often bring such production in-house, but that is also costly 
as it cuts them off from crucial knowledge of technologically advanced suppliers, while in-
house divisions rarely have the same innovative track-record of external suppliers. It is not 
surprising that these type of close relationships are distinguished from other relationships in 
our sample by simultaneously high complexity, high supplier capabilities, and low 
codifiability. 
It is also intuitive that these collaborative relationships are associated with low values of 
cultural distance, longer contract length, and high value added. Distances are also lower than 
for market or modular. 
Modular governance 
In the initial comparison across all governance types there were no unique predictions for 
modular relationships. The values for all three characteristics should be high, but that was 
each time also the case for at least one other governance mode. The pairwise comparisons 
with other governance modes that are preferred if one of the characteristics is low all 
generated the expected signs: a negative coefficient on complexity in the market vs. modular 
comparison; a negative coefficient on capability in the captive vs. modular comparison; and 
a positive coefficient on codifiability in the modular vs. relational comparison.  
It is not directly predicted by the theory, but seems reasonable that modular governance 
is also characterized by more capable suppliers than in market governance and more complex 
components than in captive governance. Transactions governed by markets only need 
suppliers that are capable enough for a particular part, which does not need to be very high 
in absolute terms. Transactions performed by captive suppliers that have low capabilities will 
be more complex than market transactions, but not much more.  
5.1 Implication: Supplier governance over a component’s lifecycle 
The results support most of the theoretical predictions at the level of individual 
transactions, i.e. sourcing contracts between a buyer and supplier for a particular part. We 
32 
 
 
now step back to take a look what the various governance types imply for differences between 
suppliers. We first classified each transaction into one of the four types, picking the type for 
which the proxy attained the highest value within its respective distribution. Next, we 
assigned each supplier to the governance type that occurred most frequently across all its 
transactions. 
In Table 9 we show two features of suppliers allocated to each type: the profit margin as 
a percentage of total sales and aggregate R&D expenditures. Profit margins are by far the 
highest for modular suppliers and lowest for market and captive suppliers. In contrast, captive 
suppliers spend most resources on R&D and market suppliers the least.   
Table 9:   Observable difference between supplier-types 
  Market Modular Relational Captive 
Number of firms 20 16 27 25 
Profit margin (% of sales) 0.5% 6.9% 1.9% 0.7% 
 (16.1) (45.3) (14.0) (14.4) 
R&D expenditure (thousands €) 52 204 261 349 
 (55) (289) (509) (595) 
Note: Average across suppliers for 2007. Supplier-type is determined based on the mode of the governance 
type over all their transactions. Standard deviations in brackets. 
These differences fit a dynamic interpretation in terms of a product lifecycle. When new 
technologies emerge and are embodied in new components, carmakers often have to produce 
them in-house as no market for them yet exists (Stigler, 1951). Once it becomes feasible to 
codify performance standards they can be outsourced to captive suppliers, but the buyers 
structure the collaboration to capture most of the surplus themselves. Captive suppliers 
initially receive training and knowledge transfers from their clients, but they invest strongly 
in R&D to build up their capabilities and graduate to a modular, more independent type of 
governance. That type of collaboration will generate them much higher profits. However, as 
the technology matures further, other suppliers also acquire the expertise and products 
become standardized, such that eventually market relationships governed by contracts 
becomes feasible and profit margins of suppliers collapse again. 
The above dynamic saw codifiability increase before capabilities, but in some cases the 
order is reversed. The crucial expertise for new products originates in highly capable, 
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specialized suppliers and the collaboration with carmakers takes the relational form. 
Suppliers spend a lot of resources on R&D, but are able to generate a decent profit margin. 
The close collaboration that the new technology still requires limits supplier’s ability to sell 
their services to many clients. Only when it becomes possible to codify specifications in a 
more objective and easily transmittable fashion can they engage in more arm’s length, 
modular collaborations, supply more clients, achieve greater bargaining power, and raise 
their profit margin. This process does not necessarily require as much R&D as creating a new 
technology, but still requires highly capable suppliers to standardize the technology. As this 
process continues, eventually the technology will lose its complexity and suppliers are 
increasingly chosen based on price and contracts used to govern relationships. In sum, 
governance becomes more market-like, which lowers supplier profits. 
6. Conclusions 
The main objective of our study was to illustrate that empirical work can and should go 
beyond firms’ make-or-buy decisions. The framework we propose distinguishes five stylized 
governance types, which includes in-house production (hierarchy) as one extreme. By 
construction we do not observe in-house transactions in our dataset of sourcing contracts. 
Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2017) work with the same dataset and use the absolute 
frequency a transaction occurs relative to the overall size of the potential outsourcing market 
as a proxy for the (inverse of the) likelihood that a transaction is performed in-house by 
carmakers. While this is a very indirect proxy, their results show that the three explanatory 
variables have the expected predictions on the make-or-buy decisions. 
The results in this paper show that those same characteristics of transactions or suppliers 
that predict whether an input is produced in-house or outsourced also predict how supplier 
relationships are organized. The proxy variables that are intuitively related to a particular 
way of organizing a sourcing relationship show systematic patterns with the explanatory 
variables of interest. The four governance types considered here are certainly not the only 
ones possible, but have showed how they follow naturally from the joint values of the three 
explanatory variables. The three explanatory variables we focused on were inspired by three 
highly developed economic literatures. Transaction cost economics emphasizes ex-post 
transaction costs due to holdup of specific assets, which we called lack of codifiability. The 
property rights theory emphasizes that allocating ownership rights can align the relative 
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strength of investment incentives with the relative importance of either party’s investments, 
which we measured by supplier capabilities. Both of these theories assume contracts to be 
incomplete, which we called complex transactions. The complexity might be a choice 
variable in some situations or it might evolve exogenously with technology. 
In this framework, market governance will be chosen if complexity is low, and more 
complicated governance forms if complexity is high. Hierarchy is only chosen if both 
codifiability and supplier capabilities are low. If only one of these dimensions is problematic, 
outsourcing is still feasible, but the collaboration with suppliers will take a particular form. 
Suppliers will be captive (low supplier capability) or relational (low codifiability) to mimic 
the advantage of in-house production that one of the theories calls for, without losing the 
incentivizing advantage of outsourcing. When both dimensions are high, both TCE and PRT 
predict outsourcing, but the complexity of the transactions requires what we called modular 
governance, involving more design responsibility and bargaining power for suppliers than in 
market relationships that are governed by contracts.  
The relationships between the four stylized governance types and the three explanatory 
variables of interest were largely consistent with the theoretical predictions. As one of the 
most downstream manufacturing industries, the automotive industry sources inputs in a wide 
variety of situations. The results suggest that carmakers tailor their way of sourcing in 
predictable way to the situations they encounter. Finally, the ordering of governance types in 
terms of the profit margins and R&D intensity for suppliers that use each type most frequently 
showed intuitive patterns. In particular, the patterns are consistent with R&D expenditures 
leading to higher capabilities and an evolution in governance. They are also consistent with 
technologies gradually becoming more standardized over their life-cycle and higher 
profitability for suppliers as they gain greater independence, until products become entirely 
standardized and profits are competed away. Such a dynamic interpretation of the evolution 
of sourcing is appealing, but not explicitly shown in our analysis. We leave a rigorous 
exploration of the dynamics for future work. 
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7. Appendix 
Table A.1  Summary statistics 
  No. of observations Mean Standard 
deviation 
(a) Dependent variables 
   
Market 16,537 0.642 1.322 
Modular 15,805 2.833 1.396 
Relational 15,331 3.963 1.628 
Captive 16,159 1.890 1.678 
(b) Key explanatory variables 
  
Complexity 16,537 0.666 0.472 
Capability 16,537 0.453 0.498 
Codifiability 16,537 0.259 0.438 
(c) Control variables    
Distance 16,047 0.966 2.152 
Hofstede culture 16,537 0.402 0.490 
Border effect 16,537 0.356 0.479 
Contract length 14,343 81.694 19.486 
Value Added 14,569 2.931 6.129 
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